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Originalism and the
Rule of the Dead
Joel Alicea

h e c o n s e r v a t i v e l e g a l m o v e m e n t is in the midst of a great
debate about its future. For decades, originalism — the theory
that the original meaning of the Constitution is binding on today’s
interpreters — has been the default theory of legal conservatism, and
so it remains today. But the struggle within legal conservatism is about
the very meaning of originalism, as novel theories have challenged long
standing beliefs about originalism’s core philosophical premises.
Since its inception, originalism has insisted on obedience to the past
in order to vindicate the sovereignty of the living. It has demanded that
today’s majorities adhere to the original meaning of the Constitution,
recognizing that this is essential if those majorities are to govern them
selves. In this, originalism has stood against the all-too-understandable
impulse to break free of past constraints and empower the present. It has
spurned calls for a “living Constitution,” the meaning of which changes
to reflect the values of society or of a chosen elite.
The new trend in originalism abandons this heritage. It self
consciously rejects the authority of the past and the duties rightfully
imposed by our forebears, elevating instead the will of the present and
the ideologies of its theorists. Having internalized the basic assumptions
of living constitutionalism, it is but one step away from becoming what
has always been considered originalism’s intellectual adversary.
If originalism is to avoid collapsing into that which it has always
opposed, legal conservatives must begin by remembering why they be
lieve in originalism. They must look to originalism’s past in order to
preserve its future.
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ORIGINALISM

AND THE

DEAD

HAND

Originalism emerged as a distinct jurisprudential movement in the 1960s
and ’70s in response to the rulings of the Warren and Burger Courts.
It was a time of great upheaval in constitutional law, as the Court
leveled old doctrines and raised new ones in their place. Living consti
tutionalism was ascendant and, in many areas, triumphant. So when
then-professor Robert Bork published his seminal article on originalism
in 1971, “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,” one
would have been justified in seeing it as an anomaly, nothing more than
a curious speed bump on the way to a living-constitutionalist future.
But by 1981, it was clear that originalism represented a new and
growing force in American law and politics. By that time, then-justice
William Rehnquist had echoed the themes of Bork’s 1971 article in an
important lecture against living constitutionalism. Harvard professor
Raoul Berger had published extensive historical studies on the original
meaning of the Constitution. And, perhaps most significantly for originalism’s long-term success, the newly elected Reagan administration
had adopted originalism as its jurisprudential guide and would soon
nominate a wave of originalists to the judiciary. In the span of only a
decade, originalism had established itself as a formidable intellectual
movement with considerable staying power.
At that point, living constitutionalists began their counterattack
in earnest. In 1980, Professor Paul Brest published a thorough critique
of originalism entitled “The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding,” which remains a fixture in the originalism literature
to this day. Brest sketched many of the problems, distinctions, and con
cepts that would become central to the debates over originalism in the
decades to come, but he made his most enduring argument only in
passing. In discussing whether the original meaning of the Constitution
has any legitimate claim to our obedience, Brest argued, “[Tjhere is no
justification for binding the present to the compromises of another age.”
With this brief assertion, Brest succinctly captured the essence of
what has come to be called the “dead-hand argument.” The dead-hand
argument, in its simplest form, objects to originalism on the grounds
that it requires those living today to obey the dictates of those longsince dead, and it asserts that the dead have no right to rule the living.
The dead-hand argument quickly became a mainstay of critiques of
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originalism. It is hardly surprising, then, that Professor David Strauss,
author of The Living Constitution, describes the dead-hand argument as
“the most fundamental problem with originalism,” invoking Thomas
Jefferson’s statement, “The earth belongs...to the living.” From the
1980s onward, the dead-hand argument has served as a popular weapon
against originalism.
Yet, despite its frequent invocation in the originalism debates,
the dead-hand argument is not merely an argument against original
ism. It is an argument against written law in general and against the
Constitution in particular, at least insofar as we take it for granted that
the Constitution — as it declares itself to be in Article VI — is a species
of law. (This is not an uncontested starting point, of course. There are
theorists, such as Professor Louis Michael Seidman, who believe that we
ought to regard the Constitution as “a work of art, designed to evoke
a mood or emotion, rather than as a legal document commanding
specific outcomes.”)
Perhaps the most basic function of law is to constrain our decision
making; as Aquinas said, by law one is “induced to act or is restrained
from acting.” All law has this characteristic, but written law has a further
characteristic: It is meant to continue in force beyond the moment of
its creation. That is the primary reason for committing law to writing.
Implicit in these characteristics of written law is an unavoidable
consequence: There will be at least some people whom the written
law purports to bind even though they were not members of the pol
ity when the law was enacted. This is true of any form of government,
democratic or otherwise, since there are always some members of
the polity leaving (through death or emigration) and others entering
(through birth or immigration). The legislator who died yesterday rules
the baby born today. It follows, then, that any theory of law that chafes
at being bound by generations past is a theory that is incompatible
with written law. To ask for written laws that only bind those living
at the moment of enactment is to ask for a legislative session without
end. The possibility of written law depends on accepting as binding the
judgments of those who came before us.
These considerations about written law in general have particular
force in the context of the American Constitution. The Constitution
was not only meant to last beyond the moment of its creation; it was “in
tended to endure for ages to come,” in the words of Chief Justice John
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Marshall. As Professor Keith Whittington has argued, constitutional
creation is no act of ordinary lawmaking. It is an act of higher lawmak
ing, the enactment of a law that determines how all other laws are to be
enacted. When the American people undertook to write a constitution,
they hoped to bind not just themselves but their successors generations
hence. That is why, as Professor Michael McConnell has observed, ar
guments that dispute the authority of the dead to bind the living are
“fatal to any form of constitutionalism. To whatever extent our presentday decisions are shaped or constrained by the Constitution — however
interpreted— we are governed by the dead hand of the past.”
The dead-hand argument, then, is no more an argument against
originalism than it is an argument against any theory that seeks to
interpret— rather than abolish— the Constitution. Nonetheless, there
is a deep connection between conservatism and originalism that helps
explain why originalists— who have mostly been conservatives — have
even greater cause to refute the dead-hand argument.
ORIGINALISM

AND CONSERVATISM

The argument thus far has focused on the incompatibility of the deadhand argument and written law, the very idea of which depends on
the living accepting the judgments of the dead. But this is a kind of
negative argument, a reductio of sorts that merely refutes the dead-hand
argument without providing an affirmative case for accepting the rule
of the dead.
The positive case is simply an implication of the negative one: By
obeying the dead, the living can demand obedience. As Judge Frank
Easterbrook once remarked, “Decisions of yesterday’s legislatures... are
enforced... because affirming the force of old laws is essential if sitting
legislatures are to enjoy the power to make new ones.” That is, “[pjeople
accept old contracts and old laws because they know that this is the only
way to ensure that promises to them are kept.” We, the living, accept the
binding force of laws passed before our time so that our laws will be
obeyed, both in our own time and beyond.
This dynamic between the living and the dead not only under
girds written law; it is foundational to a proper conception of popular
sovereignty under the Constitution. Indeed, it is at the heart of what
Whittington has called the dualist conception of democratic theory.
Under this framework, “the people” exist in their sovereign capacity only
152
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when they engage in higher lawmaking— the making and amending of
the Constitution. This lawmaking is of a higher order, as it sets the rules
by which all other laws can be made and sets the limits of what those
laws can do. At all other times and for all other lawmaking, ordinary
politics is the norm, and in such circumstances, the people do not act
as the sovereign — though they retain the power to reassert their sover
eignty at any moment through the process of constitutional amendment.
This is not to deny, of course, that the people remain the ultimate source
of authority in a polity during a time of ordinary politics; it is simply to
say that they and their representatives are acting under or subordinate to
the rules that the people established in their sovereign capacity.
This conception of popular sovereignty stems from the same kinds
of considerations that uphold written law. In the same way that the
dead-hand argument is hostile to any form of written law, saying that
the people act in their sovereign capacity in everyday politics is hostile
to a written constitution. A constitution is meant to guide and limit
ordinary politics, and if ordinary politics were the domain of the people
acting as sovereign, then every statute would be the equivalent of a con
stitutional amendment, and the idea of a written constitution would
become meaningless. As Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison:
To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is
that limitation committed to writing; if these limits may, at any
time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinc
tion between a government with limited and unlimited powers
is abolished if those limits do not confine the persons on whom
they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of
equal obligation.
Once it is conceded that the people can act as sovereign in ordinary
politics, the distinction between ordinary and higher lawmaking breaks
down, and the written constitution becomes a mere placeholder for
whatever a passing majority wishes to do.
The philosophical assumptions inherent in this dynamic are deeply
conservative. It is by obeying the judgments of our predecessors that we
are empowered to make judgments of our own. By our act of submis
sion, we attain self-government. Society is, then, in the truest sense,
what Burke described: “[A] partnership not only between those who
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are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and
those who are to be born.” We look upon our written laws, to cite Burke
again, as “an entailed inheritance derived from our forefathers, and to
be transmitted to our posterity— as an estate specially belonging to
the people.”
This relationship between generations involves mutual duties and ob
ligations that exist simply by virtue o f being in society. There is no moment
of decision, no ballot that one fills out to accept these responsibilities.
Rather, they inhere in the nature of an ordered society because such
societies require mutual trust and self-sacrifice. To suggest that each of
us should be free to pursue only what we desire without regard for the
obligations that society demands of us, on the grounds that we were
never given a choice in the matter, is to suggest that society should cease
to exist.
These philosophical assumptions underlying written law are the
essence of originalism. We must submit to the commands of the dead
in order to govern ourselves, and in order to submit, we must under
stand those commands according to their original meaning. It would
be farcical to claim that we are being obedient to a rule if we arro
gated to ourselves the power to change the meaning of that rule. It
would be tantamount to telling past generations: “We will obey your
laws — so long as they mean what we say they mean.” The rejection of
the dead-hand argument is therefore not just about defending the va
lidity of written law in general; it is about defending originalism’s core
philosophical assumptions.
Similarly, we see that the argument over the dead-hand of the past
is about far more than the viability of originalism. At stake is the idea
of written law, of popular sovereignty, and of society as an intergenerational partnership between the living and the dead. To accept the
dead-hand argument is to reject all that and to embrace a radically dif
ferent view of law and society, one that novel strains of originalism are
forcing us to consider.
ORIGINALISM

THEN

AND

NOW

Since its modern inception in the 1970s, originalism has undergone sev
eral important theoretical shifts occasioned by powerful criticisms. In
many ways, this process has been a heartening example of how schol
arly discourse should operate. As non-originalists pointed out serious
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problems with aspects of early versions of originalism, originalists modi
fied their theory to strengthen and improve it.
One of the most important modifications has been the move away
from the original intentions of the founders and toward the original
meaning of the constitutional text. During the 1980s, critics such as
Brest, H. Jefferson Powell, Justice William Brennan, and others pointed
out that originalism’s focus on what the founders intended by particular
language in the Constitution ran into difficult theoretical obstacles. For
instance, it demands an answer to the question of just whose intentions
matter. Is it those who attended the Constitutional Convention, the
ratifiers in the state conventions, or the people at large? Moreover, how
can we today, two hundred years removed from the founding, discern
something as ethereal as the intentions of men whose ways of thinking
were so different from our own?
Significantly, around the same time, legal conservatives, led by a
pair of federal circuit court judges named Antonin Scalia and Frank
Easterbrook, were making similar types of arguments against the way in
which federal courts routinely interpreted statutes. This was the begin
ning of the movement known as textualism. The reigning orthodoxy in
the federal judiciary was that courts should enforce congressional intent
when applying statutes by relying on the legislative history contained in
committee reports, floor debates, and other sources. Textualists argued
that what mattered were the words of the statute understood in their
context, not what Congress might have thought it was doing when it
chose those words. The words, not the intentions, were all that we knew
had been agreed upon as law.
It was fitting, then, that as a Supreme Court justice, Scalia led the
shift away from the original intentions of the founders and toward the
original meaning of the words of the Constitution. As Scalia would later
say in A Matter o f Interpretation, “What I look for in the Constitution
is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the
text, not what the original draftsmen intended.” In this way, legal
conservatism’s statutory and constitutional theories were harmonized,
and many of the criticisms of the intentionalist version of originalism
became inert.
However, this change opened the door to later theoretical develop
ments. Once the focus shifted away from intentions and toward the text,
it raised the possibility of interpretations that differed from what the
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enactors of the constitutional text intended. New theories flowed into
that conceptual space, emphasizing the views of the present over the
demands of the past. The center of gravity in originalism slowly moved
away from an intergenerational partnership of the dead, the living, and
the not-yet born and toward a presentist, individualistic conception of
law and society.
Two theorists have been the leading figures in this movement:
Georgetown professor Randy Barnett and Yale professor Jack Balkin. Their
theories have been the vanguard of this novel originalism, albeit with very
different ideological valences, and, if legal conservatism opts for a new
vision of originalism, it will be due to the influence of both theorists. Both,
therefore, must be discussed if originalism— and legal conservatism—-is
to avoid the perilous path down which both theories lead.
RANDY

BARNETT AND THE

INDIVIDUAL

SOVEREIGN

O f the two theorists, Barnett is the more familiar to legal conservatives.
He has been the intellectual force behind the rise of a more libertarian
legal conservatism that takes a more expansive view of judicial power
than legal conservatives have in the past.
Barnett’s theory begins from a quintessentially libertarian premise: a
view of popular sovereignty in which sovereignty is located in each indi
vidual person. Because each person is a sovereign, no law can command
the obedience of the people unless the rights of individuals, as sovereigns,
are respected. Barnett believes that the sovereign people can consent to
having laws imposed upon them, but, because each person is a sovereign,
each person must give consent in order for the laws to have legitimacy.
And since such unanimous consent is impossible (though Barnett believes
it is possible in small groups, such as neighborhood associations), the au
thority of the Constitution cannot rest on the consent of the governed.
Therefore, as a kind of second-best option, Barnett proposes that
the Constitution can com mand obedience only insofar as it does not
infringe on those inherent rights of each individual sovereign: “After
all, if a law has not violated a person’s rights (whatever these rights may
be), then that person need not consent to it.” One might call this the
“harmless error” solution to constitutional illegitimacy. To that end,
laws are owed obedience if they meet two criteria: They are “(1) necessary
to protect the rights of others and (2) proper insofar as they do not violate
the preexisting rights of the persons on whom they are imposed.”
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Barnett believes that the Constitution, when interpreted according
to its original meaning, might meet these criteria. For that reason, he
champions the importance of the Constitution’s writtenness, which he
sees as designed to “lock in” the procedures and rights without which
the Constitution would certainly be illegitimate. Therefore, it becomes
essential to preserve the original meaning because “any meaning
contrary to the original meaning would be to contradict or change
the meaning of the text and thereby to undermine the value of
writtenness itself.”
Notice the acceptance of the dead-hand argument contained in
Barnett’s theory. Not only does it reject the authority of the dead, it
rejects the authority of the living unless that authority is premised on
affirmative, unanimous consent (with the “harmless error” solution
as an alternative means of legitimation). This makes sense given, in
Barnett’s words, his “individualist conception of popular sovereignty.”
For Barnett, there is no intergenerational partnership of the living and
the dead; there is only the sovereignty of the living individual. Indeed,
his description of each individual as a “sovereign” is particularly telling.
As Bodin instructs us, “[sjovereignty is th e ... power vested in a com
monwealth,” and, therefore, to think of each individual as a sovereign
is, in a real sense, to think of each individual as his own commonwealth.
This is a dramatic repudiation of the traditional conservative notion that
society is man’s natural state and that society rightly places duties on
each person — the position that serves as the foundation for a regime of
written law and the one on which originalism comfortably rests.
Barnett’s repudiation of that premise has significant theoretical
consequences. At its core, living constitutionalism is about forcing the
Constitution to conform to the will of the living, whether “the living”
is defined as society at large or a subgroup upon whom the living con
stitutionalist would confer power. Its fundamental orientation, then, is
toward the present. That is why it is so hostile to originalism’s demand
that the present obey the past. We see that same orientation in Barnett’s
theory, with its rejection of the authority of the dead and its embrace
of the sovereignty of each living individual. And just as the logic of
living constitutionalism — like any theory that accepts the dead-hand
argument— eventually leads to the cashiering of the Constitution alto
gether, Barnett’s philosophical assumptions leave him but a step away
from a libertarian version of living constitutionalism.
i57
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The influence of living constitutionalism is evident in what Barnett
calls the “presumption of liberty,” a legal test that he argues should be ap
plied to all laws. It is perhaps the most well-known aspect of his theory.
Barnett would have the federal judiciary subject laws to the two-pronged
criteria he outlines for constitutional legitimacy, placing the burden on
the government to show that its actions are, as noted, “(1) necessary to
protect the rights of others and (2) proper insofar as they do not violate
the preexisting rights of the persons on whom they are imposed.” This
amounts to a presumption that challenged laws are unconstitutional.
Yet, as Barnett himself would concede, the “presumption of liberty” is
not itself part of the original meaning of the Constitution. Rather, it is
a test that Barnett thinks implements the unenumerated rights he be
lieves are located in the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. True to his
theory’s orientation away from the dead, Barnett would grant power to
the judiciary that goes beyond the original meaning of the Constitution
(the past) in the name of the libertarian individualism that sustains his
theory (the present).
Barnett m ight respond that these concerns are overwrought. He
could argue that he reaches the same conclusions that most originalists have for decades, with a few im portant exceptions, and that his
theory has reinvigorated originalism for a new generation of legal con
servatives. These would be fair responses. Few scholars have been as
prolific in researching the original meaning of various constitutional
provisions as Barnett has, and much of his scholarship in this regard
would command the agreement of originalists old and new. There is
no question that Barnett’s contributions to the conservative legal move
ment are significant, that his commitment to originalism is sincere, and
that he has worked in good faith to uncover the original meaning of
the Constitution.
But none of this bridges the gap between Barnett’s philosophical as
sumptions and those of his originalist predecessors. Some of the results
m ight be the same, but the starting points are quite different. Those
starting points, in turn, lead beyond the boundaries Barnett has placed
on his theory. The presumption of liberty is not essential to Barnett’s
originalism, but it shows the living-constitutionalist implications of his
premises. Once the dead-hand argument is accepted, we can clearly see
what follows.
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JACK BALKIN

AND

“OUR

LAW”

As much as Barnett accepts living-constitutionalist premises, his theory
is more recognizably originalist than that of Jack Balkin, a leading figure
on the legal left whose recent embrace of originalism has been an impor
tant development for originalist scholarship. Balkin, like Barnett, rejects
the authority of the past. He hangs the legitimacy of the Constitution
on its ability to be “responsive to the public’s values.” Because the people
are sovereign, he continues, “[t]here must be some way for people to ex
press their dissatisfaction with the Constitution-in-practice and demand
that courts and the political branches reform, restore, or redeem the
law to make it conform with what the public believes the Constitution
properly should stand for” (emphasis added). This is full-throated living
constitutionalism, a claim that the Constitution’s legitimacy depends on
its consistency with current societal values.
In Balkin’s view, the way in which the Constitution keeps up with
today’s society is through its more “abstract terms and vague clauses.”
According to Balkin, because the people chose to frame these clauses
at a high level of generality, they can be faithfully interpreted only as
broad principles that are to be applied in light of changing societal val
ues. Crucially for Balkin, without updating the Constitution through
these more general clauses — a process even he calls living constitution
alism— the Constitution “will lose [its] democratic legitimacy because
the Constitution that it justifies and legitimates cannot be ‘our law’ for
an increasing number of citizens.”
At the same time, Balkin believes that where a clause is very spe
cific— such as the requirement that there be two senators from every
state — the original meaning will supply all of the interpretive content.
Balkin asserts that, if the people choose to accept the Constitution, they
must accept the binding force of these “hard-wired” clauses for two
reasons: The whole docum ent was the product of an act of popular
sovereignty, and the Constitution is a legal document, which can be
modified only through legitimate legal means.
Balkin therefore proposes — in a good-faith attempt to implement
what he sees as the original meaning of the Constitution — a fusion of
living constitutionalism and originalism, which can be somewhat over
simplified as follows: The vague, general clauses are to be read according
to changing societal norms, while the more specific, “hard-wired”
i59
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clauses are to be read according to their original meaning. According to
Balkin, his is not “an argument... against the dead hand of the past in
general— [I]t is an argument against the imposition of a dead hand of
the past” to those more general clauses that, in Balkin’s view, are prop
erly interpreted as inviting living constitutionalism.
The problem is that Balkin’s underlying theory of legitimacy does not
permit this response. Having staked the legitimacy of the Constitution
on whether it conforms to the views of the living, he has no basis for
requiring the living to abide by any of the judgments of the dead, and
that is as much true of the so-called “hard-wired” provisions as of the
more general ones. The level of generality is irrelevant if the legitimacy
of the Constitution depends on its coincidence with current societal
values. Many of the Constitution’s most specific provisions are its most
significant, such as its command that “no Person holding any Office
under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during
his Continuance in Office.” But if today’s society were clamoring for a
parliamentary system, in which executive officers were members of the
legislature, the rule-like Ineligibility Clause would stand in the way of
making the Constitution “our law,” which, according Balkin’s theory,
would pose a significant threat to the legitimacy of the Constitution.
Balkin might respond that, once the people decide to accept the
Constitution, they are required to obey even the “hard-wired” provi
sions for reasons of popular sovereignty and the rule of law. But, again,
if the Constitution’s legitimacy depends on its reflection of current
societal values, it is irrelevant whether the people approved of the docu
ment at some point in the distant past. What matters, under the logic of
Balkin’s theory of legitimacy, are the demands of the people now.
If the Constitution must be “our law” in order to maintain its legiti
macy, then there is no principled basis for forbidding the living from
changing even the most rule-like provisions of the Constitution to make
them suited to modern values. If the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause is subject to living constitutionalism, then so is the presidentialage requirement. The dead-hand argument tolerates no other answer.
T H E L E G A C Y OF T H E D E A D H A N D

Originalism has long been the conservative legal movement’s inter
pretive theory. There are, no doubt, many reasons why this has been
so. Historical contingencies played a major role, and no movement
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will be entirely consistent in its motivating theories. Nonetheless, the
conservative legal movement’s adoption of originalism was no mere
happenstance or relationship of convenience. It is, rather, founded
on shared philosophical premises: a belief in the value of the past, the
duties of the present, and the delicacy of a legal regime founded on both.
Originalism, properly understood, has endeavored to preserve — and,
where necessary, restore — that regime in the face of relentless scholarly
criticism, political attacks, and the ever-present desire to break free from
the constraints that prevent us from doing what we will.
That legacy is now imperiled by the rise of novel originalist theo
ries that would, in time, lead legal conservatives into the very errors
they have long opposed. Barnett and Balkin look to the history of the
Constitution, but originalism is about more than history. They stress
the importance of the constitutional text, but originalism is about more
than words. By embracing the dead-hand argument, Barnett and Balkin
replace originalism’s core philosophical assumptions with those of living
constitutionalism. To the extent that legal conservatives adopt Barnett
and Balkin’s views, they adopt premises antithetical to their own.
Legal conservatives would do better to hold fast to the principles that
have served them well, to safeguard that which it has been their special
duty to defend. They would do better to insist on the rule of the dead.
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